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INTRODUCTION
As the class action lawsuit has emerged as a complex and important
device of civil litigation, it has become a source of significant controversy
for courts, the political branches, and scholars. Beyond disputes about their
general efficacy,' class actions raise a number of difficult challenges related
2
to the "unique responsibilities" they impose on courts. Many of the
managerial complexities facing judges stem from the fact that named
plaintiffs and their counsel typically represent many unnamed plaintiffs not
actively involved in the lawsuit. Concerns about protecting absent class
members pervade class action law, whether in requirements that the class
representative be adequate, that settlements be fair to all class members,
that there be opportunities for class members to voice their concerns, or that
class members be able to opt out.
This Note examines one such issue: the extent to which judges can and
should issue prophylactic orders limiting communications between
defendants and potential class members when defendants are involved in a
structurally coercive relationship with potential class members. 3 By
structures of coercion I mean those relationships where the speaker and
potential class members have an ongoing business relationship in which
potential class members depend financially on the speaker. Although one
can imagine situations where named plaintiffs have coercive influence over
potential class members coercion more commonly arises where potential
class members are in ongoing business relationships with defendants.
Therefore, this Note addresses defendant communications in the context of
structurally coercive relationships, focusing on the paradigmatic employer-
employee relationship.5
1. See, e.g., 1 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, at ix
(4th ed. 2002) (noting that class actions "have been called powerful tools to redress wrongdoing
that advance vital public interests without cost to taxpayers as well as lawyer driven boondoggles
benefiting only the attorneys who bring them").
2. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21, at 243 (2004); see also 2 CONTE &
NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 5:53, at 472 (noting various "[i]ncreased manageability problems" with
class actions); DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 445 (2000) ("Judges play a unique role in damage class actions .... ").
3. When I discuss limitations on communications with potential class members, I am
referring to the time between when a class is filed and when the opt-out period ends. Note that
class members may choose to opt out only from class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the
"most comprehensive" of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b). 2 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note
1, § 4:1, at 4; see also Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985) ("In most class
actions an absent plaintiff is provided at least with an opportunity to 'opt out' of the class .... ").
4. For example, union officials who are plaintiffs in a class action that includes the union's
members might have the power to coerce potential class members into participating.
5. At an early stage of the recent and widely publicized gender discrimination claim against
Morgan Stanley, for example, the court limited the communications of the defendant company
with potential class members. See EEOC v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 206 F. Supp. 2d 559
(S.D.N.Y. 2002). Although this Note discusses cases where courts have analyzed other
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The Manual for Complex Litigation recognizes that "[d]irect
communications .... whether by plaintiffs or defendants, can lead to
abuse," 6 and courts have long agreed that it is their responsibility "to
safeguard [class members] from unauthorized, misleading communications
from the parties or their counsel.",7 At the same time, courts have realized
that restrictions on speech between litigants raise First Amendment
concerns.
8
In order to guard against possible abuses, previous editions of the
Manual recommended sweeping restrictions on communications; as a
result, for years courts routinely adopted local rules and issued protective
orders that prohibited named parties and their counsel from communicating
with potential class members. But in 1981, a unanimous Supreme Court in
Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard struck down a protective order that prevented the
NAACP from communicating with potential class members in a case
alleging racial discrimination. 9 Rejecting the broad prophylactic orders
recommended by the Manual, the Court held that "an order limiting
communications between parties and potential class members should be
based on a clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the
need for a limitation and the potential interference with the rights of the
parties."' 0 Today, because of Bernard, courts analyze limitations on both
plaintiff and defendant communications on a case-by-case basis and usually
require evidence that potentially abusive communications have occurred.
This Note argues that Bernard can and should, as a matter of policy, be
interpreted to allow prophylactic orders limiting communications when a
structurally coercive relationship exists between defendants and potential
structurally coercive relationships, such as those between franchisors and franchisees or banks and
future borrowers, see infra note 114 and accompanying text, the employer-employee context
arises most often in the case law and presents the clearest example of a structurally coercive
relationship.
6. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 2, § 21.12, at 248.
7. Erhardt v. Prudential Group, 629 F.2d 843, 846 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Gulf Oil Co. v.
Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 (1981) ("Because of the potential for abuse, a district court has both the
duty and the broad authority... to enter appropriate orders governing the conduct of counsel and
parties."); Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., 186 F.R.D. 672, 675 (N.D. Ga. 1999) ("[It is] exceedingly
clear that district courts may enter an order prohibiting class communications that will likely cause
imminent and irreparable injury to one of the parties.").
8. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Lake Asbestos of Que. (In re Sch. Asbestos Litig.), 842 F.2d 671,
680 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Orders regulating communications between litigants ... pose a grave threat
to first amendment freedom of speech."); Belt v. EmCare, 299 F. Supp. 2d 664, 667 (E.D. Tex.
2003) ("[T]he First Amendment requires the Court to tailor any restrictions on a party's ability to
speak with absent class members."); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH),
supra note 2, § 21.12, at 247-48 (noting that regulating communications prior to class certification
"could implicate the First Amendment"); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 30.24, at
232-33 (1995) ("Because First Amendment principles are implicated, however, the court should
not restrict communications between the parties or their counsel and actual or potential class
members, except when justified to prevent serious misconduct." (footnote omitted)).
9. 452 U.S. 89.
10. Id. at 101.
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class members." Communications in these contexts present distinctive
problems.' 2  First, speech can intimidate potential class members and
pressure them to make decisions about participating in the class based on a
fear of retaliation rather than on independent analysis. Second, because
potential class members may generally rely on the defendant for
information about issues affecting the company, they may mistakenly trust
one-sided or misleading defendant communications.
Part I discusses the justifications for the routine imposition of broad
restrictions prior to Bernard as well as emerging Supreme Court doctrine on
attorney solicitation in the years preceding Bernard. It then examines
Bernard, the only Supreme Court opinion on the subject of class
communications. Finally, it explains how lower courts have applied
Bernard, noting that only a few have issued prophylactic orders based on
structurally coercive relationships without evidence that inappropriate
communications have occurred.
Part II examines the ways in which limitations on communications may
or may not advance the goals of class action litigation. The broad
limitations at issue in Bernard frustrated the objectives of Rule 23. By
contrast, when defendants hold a structurally coercive position over
potential class members, there is particularly great potential for abusive
communications, which justifies some limitations. Focusing on the
employer-employee relationship, Part II surveys sexual harassment and
union election cases and literature in order to identify the dynamics of
coercion in the workplace.
Part III proposes that courts issue certain prophylactic limitations upon
a finding that a structurally coercive relationship exists between defendants
and potential class members. Specifically, I suggest that where such a
relationship exists, courts should generally prohibit defendants from
communicating orally about the litigation with potential class members and
should require that written communications be filed with the court and
opposing counsel. Finally, Part IV addresses possible First Amendment and
other objections to the prophylactic limitations proposed in Part III.
11. I focus on defendant communications because potential class members are engaged in
structurally coercive relationships with defendants more often than with named plaintiffs.
However, my argument for prophylactic limitations applies equally when named plaintiffs are in a
structurally coercive relationship with potential class members.
12. The most recent Manual, unlike previous editions, seems to implicitly acknowledge the
unique nature of structurally coercive relationships:
If defendants are in an ongoing business relationship with members of a putative class,
the court might consider requiring production of communications relating to the case.
In appropriate cases, courts have informed counsel that communications during an
ongoing business relationship, including individual releases or waivers, must be
accompanied by notification to the members of the proposed class that the litigation is
pending.
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 2, § 21.12, at 248.
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This Note contributes to existing literature by focusing on the problem
of structurally coercive relationships in class action lawsuits.1 3 It explains
and expands on a position staked out by just a few courts, and it provides
specific suggestions to courts adjudicating class action lawsuits. In addition,
although this Note deals with the particular problem of communications
with potential class members, it may more broadly help illuminate the
dynamics of workplace coercion and possible remedies to combat it.
1. GULF OIL v. BERNARD AND ITS APPLICATION BY LOWER COURTS
A. Approaches to Class Communications Prior to Bernard
Following the recommendations of previous editions of the Manual for
Complex Litigation, courts once routinely imposed broad bans on
communications with potential class members. As a result of "unfortunate
experiences where parties and counsel have abused the class action
process,"' 4 the 1973 Manual "recommended that each court adopt a local
rule forbidding unapproved direct or indirect written and oral
communications by formal parties or their counsel with potential and actual
class members."' 15 However, in addition to suggesting that courts should
allow nonabusive communications proposed by the parties, the Manual also
stated that client-initiated contact and regular business communications
should be exempt from the ban. 16 Prior to Bernard, numerous courts heeded
the Manual's advice by adopting local rules that prevented unauthorized
13. In the years immediately following Bernard, at least two student notes argued that
Bernard should not apply to defendant communications and that courts should restrict the
communications of all class action defendants. Donald D. Levenhagen, Note, Class Actions:
Judicial Control of Defense Communication with Absent Class Members, 59 IND. L.J. 133 (1984);
Robert C. Rice, Note, Defendant Communications with Absent Class Members in Rule 23(b)(3)
Class Action Litigation, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 145 (1985). More recent works have addressed
issues surrounding attorney communications in class actions, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, Pre-
Certification Communication Ethics in Class Actions, 36 GA. L. REV. 353 (2002), and
communication problems in particular cases, e.g., Christopher Y. Miller, Comment, Unfair
Burdens: Restrictions on Ex Parte Contacts and the Mitsubishi Sexual Harassment Case, 94 Nw.
U. L. REV. 697 (2000).
14. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.41, at 13 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION]. A later edition further explained that the recommended restrictions were
made because of repeated instances, reported by federal judges, of actual ex parte
communications with class members that impaired, frustrated, and adversely affected
the administration of justice. These reports demonstrated that the improper and
unethical communications were frequently difficult, and sometimes impossible, to
detect in time to prevent harm; that they had a virtually unlimited variety in form and
content; and that the opportunities for direct, great, and often irreparable injury were
better prevented than attempts made to repair the injury after it had already occurred.
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.41, at 30 n.43 (5th ed. 1982) [hereinafter 1982 MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION].
15. 1973 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 14, § 1.41, at 12.
16. Id.
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communications 17 or by issuing protective orders that had largely the same
effect.' 8 Some courts discussed First Amendment concerns, 19 but most did
not, and the Manual's recommendations for a time enjoyed "ubiquitous"
application.
20
The 1973 Manual specified four general areas of potential abuse that
justified the default imposition of local rules or orders prohibiting
communications with the class:
(1) solicitation of direct legal representation of potential and actual
class members who are not formal parties to the class action;
(2) solicitation of funds and agreements to pay fees and expenses
from potential and actual class members who are not formal parties
to the class action; (3) solicitation by formal parties of requests by
class members to opt out ... ; and (4) unauthorized direct or
indirect communications from counsel or a party, which may
misrepresent the status, purposes and effects of the action and of
court orders therein and which may confuse actual and potential
class members and create impressions which may reflect adversely
on the court or the administration ofjustice.2'
Although the third area specifically addressed a type of defendant
communication and the fourth area encompassed defendant
communications, courts and scholars in the years preceding Bernard largely
focused on issues surrounding the communications of named plaintiffs and
their counsel.22
Concerns about the effects of plaintiff communications largely
stemmed from longstanding arguments about the harms of solicitation. As
the Supreme Court noted in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, the
"substantive evils of solicitation have been stated over the years in
sweeping terms: stirring up litigation, assertion of fraudulent claims,
17. For a list of some districts that adopted and applied the Manual's suggested rule, see
Zarate v. Younglove, 86 F.R.D. 80, 87 n.5 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
18. See, e.g., Am. Fin. Sys. v. Pickrel, 18 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (West) 314, 315 (D. Md. Feb. 1,
1974) (oral opinion) (prohibiting communications without prior approval of the court); Vance v.
Fashion Two Twenty, 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (West) 1513, 1513-14 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 1973)
(issuing a protective order similar to the Manual's proposed rule); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 271
F. Supp. 722, 728 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (prohibiting party or counsel communications with the class
"in the absence of court approval").
19. See, e.g., Rodgers v. U.S. Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152, 162 (3d Cir. 1975) (stating that a
rule modeled after the Manual "raises serious first amendment issues"); Waldo v. Lakeshore
Estates, 433 F. Supp. 782, 791 (E.D. La. 1977) (upholding a local rule copied from the Manual
but only after considering whether "freedoms protected under the First Amendment [were]
needlessly restrained").
20. 5 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 15:7, at 34.
21. 1973 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 14, § 1.41, at 11.
22. See, e.g., Waldo, 433 F. Supp. at 790; Pamela Mathy, The Validity of Class Action No
Comment Rules, 13 RUTGERs L.J. 285, 305 (1982); Recent Case, Rodgers v. United States Steel
Corp., 508 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1975), 88 HARV. L. REv. 1911 (1975).
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debasing the legal profession, and potential harm to the solicited client in
the form of overreaching, overcharging, underrepresentation, and
misrepresentation., 23 In upholding a local rule copied verbatim from the
Manual, one court suggested that concerns about solicitation were "all the
more compelling in the class action framework, given the heightened
susceptibilities of nonparty class members to solicitation amounting to
barratry as well as the increased opportunities of the parties or counsel to
'drum up' participation in the proceeding."
24
However, before Bernard, the Court increasingly signaled that
sweeping restrictions on solicitation would no longer automatically
withstand scrutiny. As early as 1963, the Court in NAACP v. Button
prevented Virginia from applying an antisolicitation statute to prohibit
25NAACP activities. In 1977 and 1978, the Court had occasion to reject
other state prohibitions on attorney solicitation. In re Primus struck down
the application of a South Carolina antisolicitation rule that had been
targeted at the ACLU for advising a group of women about their legal rights
and subsequently offering free legal services through letters.26 Building on
Button, the Court held,
Without denying the power of the State to take measures to correct
the substantive evils of undue influence, overreaching,
misrepresentation, invasion of privacy, conflict of interest, and lay
interference that potentially are present in solicitation of
prospective clients by lawyers, this Court has required that broad
rules framed to protect the public and to preserve respect for the
administration of justice must not work a significant impairment of
the value of associational freedoms.27
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Court overturned disciplinary
action taken against attorneys who had advertised routine legal services,
holding that "advertising by attorneys may not be subjected to blanket
suppression. ' '28 Although in Ohralik the Court ultimately rejected the
challenge of an attorney who had been disciplined for soliciting accident
victims in person (including at a hospital), it did so only after scrutinizing
the state interests at stake in preventing misconduct.
29
23. 436 U.S. 447, 461 (1978).
24. Waldo, 433 F. Supp. at 790. Another court suggested that "[f]orbidding solicitation may
also help the court assure the proper and efficient conduct of the [class] action." Zarate v.
Younglove, 86 F.R.D. 80, 95 (C.D. Cal. 1980). But see Recent Case, supra note 22, at 1918
("[T]here is little reason to believe that the dangers of solicitation are sufficiently greater in class
actions than in individual suits to justify [additional] burdens ... .
25. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
26. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
27. Id. at 426 (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977).
29. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,464 (1978).
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B. Bernard: The End of Pervasive Limitations on Communications in
Class Actions
In the years prior to Bernard, some scholars began to question the
legality and benefits of broad local rules and orders limiting
communications,3 ° and a few lower courts invalidated orders and rules that
were based on the Manual's proposal. 31 This increasing skepticism of the
Manual's recommendations, coupled with the Supreme Court's growing
hostility to sweeping restrictions on solicitation,32 set the stage for the Court
to consider the routine limitations on communication in class actions. In
Bernard, the Court faced a startling set of facts, reminiscent of Button,
which made clear the practical implications and dangers of these broad
restrictions on communications.
The case involved a class action that alleged racial discrimination in the
employment practices of Gulf Oil and one of its labor unions. Prior to the
filing of the class action, Gulf Oil and the EEOC had entered a conciliation
agreement in which Gulf Oil agreed to provide back pay to alleged victims
of racial and gender discrimination and to implement an affirmative action
program. Subsequently, the NAACP filed a class action on behalf of
employees who believed that the conciliation agreement provided
inadequate compensation. After one of the plaintiffs' lawyers met with
potential class members and allegedly encouraged them to join the class
action instead of signing releases in return for back pay, Gulf Oil sought an
order limiting communications by parties and their counsel with class
members.3
3
Adopting the Manual's recommendations, the district court issued an
order banning all communications without prior court approval between
30. See, e.g., Mathy, supra note 22 (arguing that rules banning communications frustrate Rule
23 and violate the First Amendment); Jeffrey R. Snyder, Comment, Judicial Screening of Class
Action Communications, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 671 (1980); Recent Case, supra note 22.
31. For example, in Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1975), the
Third Circuit disallowed the application of a local rule that barred communications prior to class
certification. The court claimed that the rule (which did not include some of the exceptions in the
Manual's model rule) "raises serious first amendment issues," id. at 162, and faulted the Manual
for not "proposing specific rules aimed at specific abuses," id. at 164. See also Coles v. Marsh,
560 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding that a district court may not restrict communications
"without a specific record showing by the moving party of the particular abuses by which it is
threatened"); Zarate v. Younglove, 86 F.R.D. 80 (C.D. Cal. 1980). Other courts, however,
explicitly rejected this approach. See, e.g., Waldo v. Lakeshore Estates, 433 F. Supp. 782, 794
(E.D. La. 1977) ("[W]e categorically oppose the notion that a policy allowing unfettered
communication to encourage participation in a class suit is consistent with the purpose of Federal
Rule 23. The potential abuses attendant upon such unregulated communication clearly undermine
the efficacy of the class action device.").
32. At least one district court, in Zarate v. Younglove, recognized that the Supreme Court's
emerging doctrine on solicitation implicated the limitations on communications in the class action
context. 86 F.R.D. at 85.
33. GulfOil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 91-95 (1981).
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parties or their counsel and actual or potential class members.34 However,
the order exempted Gulf Oil's communications about the conciliation
agreement. 5 When the plaintiffs' lawyers submitted for court approval a
leaflet encouraging employees to talk to a lawyer before signing a release,
the court waited a month, then denied the request two days after a court-
imposed deadline for employees to accept Gulf Oil's back-pay offer.
The Court concluded that the district court had abused its discretion.
The Court recognized "the possibility of abuses in class-action litigation,
and agree[d] ... that such abuses may implicate communications with
potential class members, 36 and it admitted that district courts have "both
the duty and the broad authority to exercise control over a class action.
3 7
Nevertheless, "faced with the unquestionable assertion by respondents that
the order created at least potential difficulties for them as they sought to
vindicate the legal rights of a class of employees, '38 the Court enunciated a
new standard: "[A]n order limiting communications between parties and
potential class members should be based on a clear record and specific
findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a limitation and the potential




Explicitly choosing not to reach the First Amendment question, the
Court instead considered whether the order was "consistent with the general
policies embodied in Rule 23.'° It did, however, "observe that the order
involved serious restraints on expression" and that courts should consider
whether restraints are "justified by a likelihood of serious abuses.'
Moreover, the Court rejected the approach of the Manual, declaring that
"the mere possibility of abuses does not justify routine adoption of a
communications ban.
'A2
Bernard was a significant victory for litigants and attorneys pursuing
class action claims. The commonplace orders and rules that, at least
sometimes, significantly impeded the ability of lawyers to prosecute class
actions and encourage participation were no longer permitted without some
evidence of abuse or the potential for abuse. Courts applied Bernard's
principles to strike down limitations on plaintiff communications, 43 and
apart from violations of general ethical guidelines, the communications of
34. Id. at 94-95 & n.5.
35. Id. at 95.
36. Id. at 104.
37. Id. at 100.
38. Id. at 101.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 99; see also id. at 101 n.15.
41. Id. at 104.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Domingo v. New Eng. Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429, 1439 (9th Cir. 1984).
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named plaintiffs and their counsel with potential class members are now
presumptively appropriate.
44
C. Lower Court Applications of Bernard to Defendant Communications
Courts often apply Bernard to the communications of defendants, 45 and
many of these cases address situations where defendants hold a structurally
coercive position over potential class members. Most opinions that consider
limiting defendant communications address plaintiffs' claims that
inappropriate communications have already occurred. Some of these
explicitly reject the notion that a structurally coercive relationship can alone
justify restrictions. Only a minority of courts have been willing to impose
restrictions before any demonstration of abusive communications, by
interpreting Bernard's requirements to allow for prophylactic orders when
there is a structure of coercion.
1. Reading Bernard To Require Evidence That Inappropriate
Communications Have Occurred
Although Bernard is unclear on the extent to which it applies to
defendant communications, a significant majority of lower courts have read
the opinion as enunciating broad principles that apply to any contacts
between parties and potential class members.46 Bernard presented a
44. See 5 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 15:9.
45. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Lake Asbestos of Que. (In re Sch. Asbestos Litig.), 842 F.2d 671,
681 (3d Cir. 1988); Ralph Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 99 Civ. 4567(AGS), 2001
WL 1035132 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2001). This increased freedom for defendants to discuss cases
with potential class members has tempered the initial victory that Bernard gave plaintiffs and their
counsel.
46. Lending support to this position is language in the opinion that fails to distinguish
between defendants and plaintiffs, referring instead to "parties" when announcing standards by
which courts must evaluate potential communications orders. For example, the Court stated that
"an order limiting communications between parties and potential class members should be based
on a clear record and specific findings." Bernard, 452 U.S. at 101. One court explained its
application of the Bernard principles to suggested limitations on defendant communications as
follows: "[W]hile the Supreme Court dealt with limitations on communications between named
plaintiffs and their counsel with prospective class members, it nonetheless set forth a broad
principle that limitations on communication with potential class members must derive from
evidence in the record and involve a weighing of competing factors." Bublitz v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 196 F.R.D. 545, 547 (S.D. Iowa 2000); see also Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis,
Inc., No. 02 C 6832, 2003 WL 22232907, at *2 n.1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2003) ("[Tlhe general
language of [Bernard] lends support for the conclusion that the enunciated standards should apply
equally to communications between a defendant and prospective class members."); Abdallah v.
Coca-Cola Co., 186 F.R.D. 672, 675 n.1 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (rejecting the interpretation that Bernard
only applies to plaintiff communications and asserting that "the Supreme Court's opinion clearly
addresses communications between all parties and potential class members, as it should").
A small minority of courts have taken the opposite position, asserting that Bernard applies
only to plaintiff communications. See, e.g., Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 689 F. Supp. 1032, 1033
(E.D. Wash. 1985); Resnick v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372, 376 (N.D. Il1. 1982). This
interpretation focuses on the fact that the communication ban in Bernard was applied to plaintiffs'
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distressing set of facts, which compelled the Court to reject a regime that
allowed judges to severely restrict communications without offering more
than the most general of justifications. But the Court failed to provide much
additional guidance; its call for "a clear record and specific findings" and
for taking into account "the potential interference with the rights of the
parties ''47 represents a relatively flexible standard that leaves much
discretion in the hands of district court judges.48 Courts agree that
defendants are prohibited from disseminating misleading information or
from attempting to intimidate potential class members49 and that it is the
responsibility of courts to ensure that class actions are adjudicated fairly.5 °
Certainly, Bernard's standards are satisfied when there have been clearly
abusive communications-like explicit threats or lies about the lawsuit-
but the record is rarely that clear, and Bernard gives little further guidance
on how its standards and requirements should be applied. What is the
burden of proof on the moving party? To what extent must a judge make
specific findings establishing a clear record? Must the moving party always
demonstrate that inappropriate communications have already occurred? Or
may a court issue a prophylactic order based on findings of a structurally
coercive relationship? What restrictions can and should courts place on
communications?
As a result of these open questions and the significant discretion of trial
judges in issuing limitations, the doctrine in this area is muddled. Most
courts today read Bernard to require evidence that potentially abusive
communications have already occurred before they impose limitations.
They vary as to what they require plaintiffs to show and what they deem
potentially abusive. Some courts have read Bernard as setting a high
counsel. At least one court noted the NAACP's role as a nonprofit entity involved in political
expression. See Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1204-05 (1 lth Cir. 1985).
Bernard's language at times suggests a narrow ruling on communications by plaintiffs and their
counsel; for example, the Court stated that "the mere possibility of abuses does not justify routine
adoption of a communications ban that interferes with the formation of a class or the prosecution
of a class action in accordance with the Rules." Bernard, 452 U.S. at 104 (emphasis added); see
also Rice, supra note 13, at 152-53 (asserting that limitations on defendant communications do not
conflict with Bernard).
47. Bernard, 452 U.S. at 101.
48. See Levenhagen, supra note 13, at 142-43.
49. See, e.g., In re Winchell's Donut Houses, L.P. Sec. Litig., No. CIV.A. 9478, 1988 WL
135503, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 12, 1988) ("Surely, a defendant may not, in its communications with
class members . . . , deceive or mislead class members."); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FOURTH), supra note 2, § 21.12, at 249 ("Defendants and their counsel ... may not give false,
misleading, or intimidating information, conceal material information, or attempt to influence the
decision about whether to request exclusion ....").
50. See, e.g., In re Winchell's, 1988 WL 135503, at *1 ("[It is a part of the responsibility of a
court administering a class action to assure, within the law, that a party to a class action does not
act inappropriately to destroy the practical utility of the class action device."); MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 2, § 21.33, at 300 ("The judge has ultimate control
over communications among the parties, third parties, or their agents and class members on the
subject matter of the litigation to ensure the integrity of the proceedings and the protection of the
class.").
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standard and have denied relief despite evidence that inappropriate
communications have occurred. 51 Many district courts, however, have
imposed limitations or requirements when they have determined that
potentially abusive communications occurred.52 These limitations include
prohibiting defendants from discussing the case with potential class
members,53 requiring defendants to notify potential class members of the
lawsuit when communicating with them on issues relevant to the case, 54 and
requiring corrective notices at defendants' expense when there has been an
inappropriate communication.
55
These opinions usually do not directly address the question of whether
the court could issue a protective order without evidence of inappropriate
communications. Some courts, however, have explicitly rejected the notion
that evidence of a structurally coercive relationship is by itself enough to
51. In Great Rivers Cooperative of Southeastern Iowa v. Farmland Industries, 59 F.3d 764
(8th Cir. 1995), for example, the Eighth Circuit concluded that a district judge had abused his
discretion by issuing a protective order in a case alleging various fraud and racketeering claims
against Farmland, an agricultural cooperative in which plaintiffs held capital credits. Farmland
published a piece in its newsletter to members (who depended financially on Farmland) that
"denounced the lawsuit" and described the charges as "a direct attack on your Association and on
the cooperative system as a whole." Id. at 765 (internal quotation marks omitted). After
determining that the article "appears to contain somewhat misleading representations .... [and]
appears to constitute an implied solicitation to potential class members to opt out," id. (internal
quotation marks omitted), the district court issued an order requiring Farmland to publish a
rebuttal article by plaintiffs in its newsletter and "to refrain from communicating anything in the
future that could reasonably be taken as an invitation to opt out," id. at 766, 765-66. The Eighth
Circuit struck down the protective order because the "district court made insufficient findings
regarding misrepresentation and the likelihood of serious abuses" and failed to conduct "serious
and careful weighing of [the defendant's] First Amendment rights." Id. at 766. As a result, the
court concluded that Farmland "should [not] be restrained from further commentary on the
litigation" and that the order was "beyond the discretion granted the district court under" Rule 23.
Id.
As Great Rivers demonstrates, courts may choose, as many have, to impose a high threshold
on plaintiffs seeking limitations of defendant communications. Several other courts have refused
to issue limitations after defendants engaged in communications that plaintiffs believed to be
coercive and misleading. In Burrell v. Crown Central Petroleum, before a class alleging gender
and racial discrimination was certified, the defendant company sent an e-mail to employees
claiming that it "was a target of a union 'corporate campaign"' and held two meetings at which the
human resources director apparently suggested that employees not get involved in the suit.
176 F.R.D. 239, 241 (E.D. Tex. 1997). The court held that there was no evidence of a potential for
abuse. Id. at 244-45.
52. See Haffer v. Temple Univ., 115 F.R.D. 506, 512 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ("Courts often issue
protective orders after parties initiate improper communications with class members.").
53. Typically, these orders specify that defendants may continue communicating in the
"ordinary course of business." Cobell v. Norton, 212 F.R.D. 14, 20 (D.D.C. 2002); accord Belt v.
EmCare, 299 F. Supp. 2d 664, 669 (E.D. Tex. 2003); Rankin v. Bd. of Educ., 174 F.R.D. 695, 697
(D. Kan. 1997); Hampton Hardware v. Cotter & Co., 156 F.R.D. 630, 634 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
54. See, e.g., Jenifer v. Del. Solid Waste Auth., Nos. CIV.A. 98-270 MMS & CIV.A. 98-565
MMS, 1999 WL 117762, at *7-8 (D. Del. Feb. 25, 1999) (requiring the defendant "to notify
putative class members of the pendency of [the class] action" when discussing agreements in
which class members would sign a release forgoing "their right to participate in [the] litigation").
55. See, e.g., Haffer, 115 F.R.D. at 512 (ordering defendants to distribute a corrective notice
and prohibiting "future improper communications").
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justify limitations under Bernard.56 In Burrell v. Crown Central Petroleum,
the district court rejected the plaintiffs' motion for an order limiting the
communications of an employer accused of racial and gender
discrimination, stating that "[i]t is not enough that a potentially coercive
relationship exists., 57 The court conceded that an ongoing business
relationship was "inherently coercive," but held that "[w]ithout evidence of
coercion, misleading statements, or efforts to undermine the purposes of
Rule 23, the court cannot make the proper findings required by . . .
Bernard.,58 In contexts other than the employer-employee one, courts have
similarly rejected the argument that an ongoing business relationship
susceptible to coercion can alone justify limitations.5 9
2. Reading Bernard To Allow for Prophylactic Restrictions on
Defendant Communications
Whether by denying that Bernard applies to all protective orders or
simply by interpreting its requirements differently, courts that have issued
prophylactic orders without evidence of inappropriate communications have
generally focused on structurally coercive relationships between defendants
and potential class members.6° In Kleiner v. First National Bank of Atlanta,
the Eleventh Circuit upheld a protective order that prevented defendants
from communicating with potential plaintiffs about the case.6 1 Plaintiffs, on
56. We can also presume that courts that refuse to impose limitations on defendant employers
after plaintiffs have argued that inappropriate communications have occurred do not believe that
an employer-employee relationship is alone sufficient to justify restrictions. See, e.g., Pruitt v.
City of Chicago, No. 03 C 2877, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9103, at *5-7 (N.D. Ill. May 19, 2004);
O'Brien v. Morse, 146 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 34,564, at 54,484 (N.D. I11. June 11, 2002).
57. 176 F.R.D. 239, 244 (E.D. Tex. 1997); see also McLaughlin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 295, 298 (D. Mass. 2004) (rejecting plaintiffs' assertion that "the employer-employee
relationship is all that is required to warrant preclusion of communications because that
relationship is inherently coercive"); Basco v. Wal-Mart Stores, No. CIV.A. 00-3184, 2002 WL
272384, at *34 (E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2002) (citing Burrell in rejecting limitations after stating that
"plaintiffs here have not provided the Court with evidence to show that Wal-Mart has abused the
process or attempted to undermine the purposes of Rule 23").
58. Burrell, 176 F.R.D. at 244-45.
59. See, e.g., Keystone Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 238 F. Supp. 2d 151, 158-59
(D.D.C. 2002) ("While an ongoing business relationship obviously increases the possibility that
communications between defendants and putative class members are coercive, the existence of
such a relationship is not enough by itself to justify precluding the communication of settlement
offers to putative class members." (citation omitted)); Jenifer, 1999 WL 117762, at *4
(concluding that although "an ongoing business relationship" may be "inherently coercive," courts
"must still require a clear record of threatened abuses").
60. One exception is Hodges v. Board of Education, in which a class of "students identified
as speech-language impaired" claimed that the school district had failed to provide certain
services. No. 97-1195-WEB, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13701, at *3 (D. Kan. July 25, 1997).
Without discussing any particular potential for coercion, the court simply determined that "[t]here
is no legitimate purpose for defendants[] to communicate with prospective members of the class
concerning the lawsuit" and prevented defendants from making "any contact or communication
with [potential class members] which expressly refers to the litigation." Id. at *5.
61. 751 F.2d 1193 (llth Cir. 1985).
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behalf of a class of borrowers, alleged that the bank had reneged on a
promise to peg interest rates. After the class was certified, plaintiffs'
counsel argued that "unilateral contacts by the Bank before the close of the
exclusion period would intimidate eligible members, 62 and the judge
issued a protective order temporarily prohibiting defense contacts while she
took the issue under advisement.
The defendants then engaged in a clearly abusive communications
scheme that successfully convinced the vast majority of potential class
members to opt out,6 3 and, on appeal, argued that the protective order itself
was invalid.64 The appellate court decided that communications from
defendants might frustrate the goals of Rule 23 in two ways. First, the
litigation was "illustrative" of the fact that when "the class and the class
opponent are involved in an ongoing business relationship"-here,
borrowers and their bank--"communications from the class opponent to the
class may be coercive. '' 65 A second and related concern was the effect of
misleading information on the ability of potential class members to make
informed decisions about whether to participate in the class action. The
court here appeared concerned with the dissemination not only of false
factual information but also of biased opinions, leading to a "one-sided
presentation of the facts, without opportunity for rebuttal," and potentially
to "irreparable" damage.66
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected arguments that the protective order
violated the First Amendment, distinguishing the case from Bernard by
62. Id. at 1196.
63. While the judge was considering whether to extend the temporary protective order, and
before the opt-out period had expired, the bank decided to solicit exclusions in hopes of "reducing
its potential liability and quelling the adverse publicity the lawsuit had spawned." Id. at 1197. The
bank's marketing director developed a phone communications scheme (which coincided with the
judge's vacation) in which loan officers called customers with the goal of persuading them to opt
out of the class. Of the 3000 customers reached, many of whom had not yet received official
notice of the class action, nearly 2800 agreed to opt out. Id. at 1198. The appellate court reached
"the almost inescapable conclusion that the point of the communications campaign was ... to
solicit as many exclusions as possible before the court was alerted to the operation," id. at 1201
n. 16, and bluntly declared that "[t]he Bank's subterfuge and subversion constituted an intolerable
affront to the authority of the district court to police class member contacts," id. at 1203.
64. The appellate court in Kleiner had the benefit of hindsight. Though it ostensibly analyzed
the limit on communications ex ante, surely the district court's order seemed more than reasonable
in light of the tactics later employed by the bank. Indeed, some district court opinions have
misinterpreted and misapplied Kleiner as a case involving a protective order imposed as a result of
abusive conduct. See, e.g., Basco v. Wal-Mart Stores, No. CIV.A. 00-3184, 2002 WL 272384, at
*4 (E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2002) (pointing to Kleiner's facts as presenting clearer evidence of actual or
potential abuse than in the instant case); Cohen v. Apache Corp., No. 89 Civ. 0076 (PNL), 1991
WL 1017, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 1991).
65. Kleiner, 751 F.2d at 1202 (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, the court frowned
on the tactics used by the bank, noting that "the loan officers who made the telephone calls were
the ones who controlled the customer's line of credit, and their on-the-spot entreaties pressured the
listener to reach an immediate decision to comply before hearing the opposite point of view." Id.
at 1206 n.27.
66. Id. at 1203.
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defining the bank's speech as commercial and, more convincingly, by
focusing on the relationship between the bank and potential class
members. 67 "Given the inherent coercion conveyed by the Bank's covert
campaign, we agree that the district court possessed the authority to regulate
such contacts without the predicate record and findings required in
Bernard., 68 Defining the relationship between defendants and potential
class members as one of "inherent coercion" is the strongest ground on
which the court justified its order. Indeed, Kleiner is important and
frequently cited not for its reading of BernaraP9 but for its analysis of the
effect of communications when there is a potentially coercive relationship.
70
By somewhat different reasoning, other courts have reached the same
conclusion: that defendant communications may sometimes be limited
without any evidence that potentially abusive communications have yet
occurred. These courts have understood Bernard to apply to any limitation
on communications with potential class members but have also determined
that a structurally coercive relationship justifies limitations. In Bublitz v.
E. duPont de Nemours & Co., the district court issued limitations after
stating that "the at-will employer-employee relationship between
Defendants and the putative class members produces a strong potential for
coercion and thus justifies minimal protections. 71 Seeking "to protect the
putative class members' right to a fair trial, the interests of the class action
and the principles of Rule 23, and the First Amendment rights of the
Defendants," the court required defendants to communicate with potential
class members in writing, provide copies of communications to the court
and plaintiffs, and give potential class members at least ten days to respond
to settlement offers that entailed a waiver of rights.72
In Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., a case alleging racial discrimination, the
court imposed limitations after acknowledging that "Coca-Cola has not
67. The circuit court vacillated between these two theories in refusing to recognize the bank's
contacts with potential class members as ordinary speech protected by the First Amendment. At
first, the court defined the bank's communications scheme as commercial speech, explaining that
"the thrust of the Bank's campaign was to defend its business dealings; its motivation, to shore up
Bank earnings." Id. at 1203 n.22. For the court, this distinguished the case from Bernard, because
there "counsel for plaintiffs had no direct financial stake in the case and because the case was a
vehicle for expressing the political beliefs of the NAACP." Id. at 1205 n.24. As a result, the court
announced that it would judge the bank's "prior restraint argument under a relaxed standard of
scrutiny." Id. at 1205. At other points in the opinion, however, what seemed important to the court
was not whether the speech was commercial or not, but rather the inherently coercive relationship
between the bank and potential class members. See id. at 1206.
68. Id. at 1206.
69. In fact, as noted above, few courts have agreed with the premise that Bernard's standards
do not apply to defendant communications.
70, See, e.g., Belt v. EmCare, 299 F. Supp. 2d 664, 668 (E.D. Tex. 2003); Bublitz v. E.I.
duPont de Nemours & Co., 196 F.R.D. 545, 547 (S.D. Iowa 2000); Jenifer v. Del. Solid Waste
Auth., Nos. CIV.A. 98-270 MMS & CIV.A. 98-565 MMS, 1999 WL 117762, at *4 (D. Del. Feb.
25, 1999).
71. Bublitz, 196 F.R.D. at 547.
72. Id. at 550.
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given the Court any reason to suspect that it will attempt to mislead its
employees and coerce them into non-participation in this case. But simple
reality suggests that the danger of coercion is real and justifies the
imposition of limitations on Coca-Cola's communications with class
members., 73 Discussing e-mails that Coca-Cola had sent to employees
regarding the case, the court noted that "there is an inherent danger that
these types of internal communication could deter potential class members
from participating in the suit out of concern for the effect it could have on
their jobs. 74 As a result, the court ordered that future communications of
this sort include language explaining that Coca-Cola could not retaliate
against employees participating in the case. 75 The court further prohibited
the company from directly discussing the case with individual potential
class members, except to speak to managers about acts that might have
exposed Coca-Cola to liability.
76
Although reaching what I believe to be the correct conclusion-that
prophylactic limitations may be imposed on defendants when a structurally
coercive relationship exists-the analyses in cases like Kleiner, Bublitz, and
Abdallah are flawed and incomplete. The Kleiner court suggested that
Bernard only applies to plaintiff communications.77 Even though the
Bublitz and Abdallah courts accepted the need to apply Bernard's
standards, their analyses remain unsatisfactory. The Bublitz court
inexplicably departed from circuit precedent78  and asserted that its
restrictions were not a prior restraint, with scant First Amendment
analysis. 79 The Abdallah court asserted that Bernard applies to defendant
communications but then failed to mention the Constitution when analyzing
73. 186 F.R.D. 672, 678 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
74. Id. at 679.
75. Id. The court in EEOC v. Morgan Stanley & Co. issued a similar remedy after stating that
"[c]oercion of potential class members by the class opponent may exist if both parties are involved
in an ongoing business relationship" and that "the danger of such coercion ... [was] sufficient to
warrant the imposition of restrictions regarding communication between defendants and potential
class members." 206 F. Supp. 2d 559, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court allowed Morgan Stanley to communicate with potential class members but required the
company to tell employees about the pending lawsuit, inform them that it could not retaliate
against those who participated in the lawsuit, and provide them with a short summary of the
EEOC claims. Id. at 563. The court also required that employees be notified that "they are not
required to join the EEOC action and that they have a private right of action." Id.
76. Abdallah, 186 F.R.D. at 679.
77. The court quoted Bernard's requirements as applying to "orders barring plaintiff contacts
with members of the plaintiff class." Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1205
( llth Cir. 1985).
78. The court acknowledged that it was guided by Great Rivers Cooperative of Southeastern
Iowa v. Farmland Industries, 59 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 1995), and that the evidence of abuse was
stronger in that case. Bublitz v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 196 F.R.D. 545, 547-48 (S.D.
Iowa 2000). The Bublitz court relied on the coercive nature of the employer-employee
relationship, but it did not reconcile its position with the analysis in Great Rivers. Id. at 548.
79. Bublitz, 196 F.R.D. at 550.
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whether and how it would limit them.80 These opinions do not cite contrary
precedent or provide sufficient explanation for their departure from the
majority approach.
II. LIMITATIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS AND THE GOALS
OF RULE 23 CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
The cases discussed above demonstrate the varying interpretations of
Bernard with regard to limitations on defendant communications. The
balance of this Note seeks to resolve this dispute and determine whether
prophylactic orders can and should be imposed after a finding that a
structurally coercive relationship exists, even when there is no evidence that
abusive communications have occurred. This Part examines the goals of
class action litigation, the policies behind Rule 23, and the ways that
defendant communications may impede those goals and policies when a
structurally coercive relationship exists.
A. Restricting Speech To Advance the Ends of Justice and the Goals of
Rule 23
When courts limit speech, they must do so to advance efficiency or the
fair administration of justice. This straightforward idea is at the heart of the
Bernard opinion. In the years before Bernard, the Supreme Court
increasingly rejected broad and automatic restrictions on attorney
solicitation, insisting that limitations could only be justified by important
state interests and after taking into account countervailing interests in
expression. In both the commercial speech cases (Ohralik and Bates) and
the public discourse cases (Primus and Button), the Court determined that
preventing solicitation per se was not an important state interest and that
limitations required a more careful analysis.
In order to determine if speech limitations were advancing the goals of
justice, the Court in Bernard explained that "the question for decision is
whether the limiting order entered in this case is consistent with the general
policies embodied in Rule 23.,,8I But with the exception of two sentences in
a footnote,82 the Court failed to explain what these policies are and why
"[c]lass actions serve an important function in our system of civil justice. 83
It is helpful to think about the "policies embodied in Rule 23" on two
80. Strangely, the court incorrectly concluded that it could issue a protective order without
consideration of the First Amendment: "Based on the foregoing cases and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(d), the court is authorized to enter this Order. Therefore, the Court will not address
the constitutionality of Local Rule 23.1(C)." Abdallah, 186 F.R.D. at 676.
81. GulfOil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99 (1981).
82. Id. at 99 n. 11.
83. Id. at 99.
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levels: the general justifications for the class action device and the
particular importance of protecting absent class members.
Courts, legislatures, and scholars have advanced three primary
justifications for class actions.84 First, class actions improve "the efficiency
and economy of litigation." 85 They allow courts to achieve greater
administrative efficiency by disposing of identical or similar claims and
avoiding a "multiplicity of actions.' '86 As a result, the class action device
also promotes fairness and res judicata by reducing the possibility of
inconsistent rulings.
87
Second, class actions allow individuals to bring claims that might
otherwise be economically infeasible. As the Supreme Court has stated, "A
significant benefit to claimants who choose to litigate their individual
claims in a class-action context is the prospect of reducing their costs of
litigation, particularly attorney's fees, by allocating such costs among all
members of the class who benefit from any recovery." 88 Class actions thus
address situations where individuals would not bring suits alone because
their potential damages would be too low.
89
Third, the plaintiff class functions as a "private attorney general" that
responds to "injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government." 90
In this sense, class actions advance two related goals. Individuals bringing
class actions may recover for injuries that the legal system might otherwise
fail to prevent or redress. And companies or institutions that would not be
sufficiently deterred from misconduct by government regulation might take
precautions or change their behavior under the threat of substantial damages
from a class action lawsuit.
91
In addition to advancing these goals, class action rules seek to facilitate
a just process for the participants. Many of Rule 23's provisions are
specifically aimed at protecting potential and absent class members. For
example, named plaintiffs must be adequate representatives of the class, and
settlements must be fair to all class members. It is commonly accepted that
84. Another justification for the class action device not discussed here is the "the protection
of the defendant from inconsistent obligations." U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388,
402-03 (1980).
85. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974); see also Geraghty, 445 U.S.
at 403; 1 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 1: 1.
86. 2 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 5:46, at 463.
87. 2 id. § 5:47.
88. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank of Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 n.9 (1980); see
also Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 403 (stating that class actions permit "the spreading of litigation costs
among numerous litigants with similar claims").
89. See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985); Roper, 445 U.S. at 339.
90. Roper, 445 U.S. at 338-39 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. See, e.g., 2 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 5:49; HENSLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 4
("[S]ome state and federal regulators say they look to class action lawsuits filed by private
attorneys to provide additional incentives for businesses to comply with regulations."); Owen M.
Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 21, 24 (1996) ("[T]he
class action could be viewed as a device to fund the private attorney general .... ").
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when the class action allows potential class members to opt out, those
members should make informed and independent decisions about their
participation.92
Although recognizing that there were opportunities for abuse, the
Bernard Court did not believe that the district court's limitations in that
case advanced any of Rule 23's goals. Preventing attorney solicitation per
se was no longer an important state interest, and any "concerns about
'stirring up' litigation . were particularly misplaced" because the
attorneys were from "a nonprofit organization dedicated to the vindication
of the legal rights of blacks and other citizens." 93 In fact, far from protecting
potential class members and the integrity of the lawsuit, the protective order
prevented plaintiffs from pursuing their claim and made it difficult for
potential class members to make informed decisions about participating.
It was clear to the Court that the order prohibiting communications
from plaintiffs' counsel had created an uneven playing field: Defendants
were allowed to communicate under the auspices of the conciliation
agreement, while plaintiffs were prevented both from informing potential
class members about the case and from gathering information from them
about the merits of the claim. As a concurring opinion at the circuit court
level noted, "communications like those enjoined in the present case might
actually benefit the judicial process through serving the rule 23 policy of
encouraging common participation in a lawsuit." 94 In addition, by severely
inhibiting plaintiffs and their counsel from pursuing their claim, the
protective order also prevented the suit from serving as a private attorney
general or as a means for claimants to pool their claims.
Furthermore, because of the protective order, potential class members
did not have enough information to make informed decisions about
participation. Quoting from the lower court opinion, the Bernard Court
noted that .'[t]he choice between the lawsuit and accepting Gulf's back pay
offer... was for each black employee to make. The court could not make it
for him, nor should it have freighted his choice with an across-the-board
ban that restricted his access to information and advice concerning the
choice."
95
92. See, e.g., Impervious Paint Indus. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720, 723 (W.D. Ky. 1981)
("It is essential that the class members' decision to participate or to withdraw be made on the basis
of independent analysis .... ").
93. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 n.l 1(1981). This point was not crucial to the
Court's view of solicitation or the protective order at issue, but the NAACP's involvement made
even clearer to the Court the arbitrary and unjustified nature of the limitation. Others have argued
that solicitation of potential class members does not raise traditional barratry concerns. See, e.g.,
Recent Case, supra note 22, at 1919 ("Requesting potential class members to remain in the class is
solicitation of legal business only in an attenuated sense: since the suit has already been filed such
communication does not stir up litigation.").
94. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459, 481 n.2 (5th Cir. 1980) (Tjoflat, J., concurring),
aff'd, 452 U.S. 89.
95. Bernard, 452 U.S. at 101 n.14 (quoting Bernard, 619 F.2d at 477).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1972 [Vol. 114:1953
2005] Limiting Coercive Speech 1973
In all these respects, the protective order in Bernard failed to advance
the objectives of Rule 23. As the Court recognized, a prophylactic ban on
all plaintiff communications is probably more likely to impede the policies
of Rule 23 than to advance them.96 This does not mean, however, that all
prophylactic bans fail to advance Rule 23's goals and should be precluded
by Bernard. I contend in Part III that some prophylactic restrictions on
communications are desirable when a structurally coercive relationship
exists. But before explaining why this is the case, it is necessary to flesh out
the dynamics of structurally coercive relationships and show how limiting
defendant communications within such relationships can further the policies
of Rule 23.
B. Structurally Coercive Relationships
Any defendant, as well as any plaintiff, might engage in abusive speech
that misinforms or coerces potential class members. But as the courts in
Kleiner, Bublitz, and Abdallah understood, the abusive potential of such
speech is much greater when the speaker is in a structurally coercive
relationship with potential class members. This is most apparent in the
workplace, where at-will employment affords employers almost unbridled
power to regulate the terms of employment, 97 including the power to
terminate employees for any reason outside of a few specific statutory and
common law exceptions. 98 The authority that at-will employment bestows
96. Although today the communications of named plaintiffs and their counsel with potential
class members are presumptively proper, courts have appropriately continued to limit plaintiff
communications when there is evidence of abuse. Named plaintiffs or plaintiffs' counsel might
still engage in abusive communications that improperly pressure potential class members to
participate in the lawsuit or that mislead them about the benefits of joining the class. Named
plaintiffs and their counsel might, for example, communicate with potential class members about
the benefits of a settlement that serves the interests of the named plaintiffs and counsel but not
absent class members. See, e.g., 5 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 15:2, at 8 (noting that
class counsel abuses include "improper use of the class action [device] to increase litigation and
settlement bargaining power for individual gain in disregard of or at the expense of claims of
absent class members, and to compromise adequate representation of the class for individual
purposes"). Some courts in recent years have imposed restrictions when plaintiffs' counsel misled
potential class members. See, e.g., EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., 960 F. Supp. 164
(C.D. 111. 1997); Babbitt v. Albertson's, No. C-92-1883 SBA (PJH), 1993 WL 150300 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 31, 1993). In addition, at least one court, in a case alleging discrimination at several Motel 6
locations, held that some restrictions were warranted to protect the "goodwill and employee
relations" of defendants. Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurposes, 172 F.R.D. 462, 467 (M.D. Fla.
1997). The court worried that "[u]nfettered and unsupervised nationwide communications prior to
class certification could pose a very real and immediate threat to Motel 6's business integrity." Id.
97. See, e.g., Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First
Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 407 (1995) ("Unless a statutory exception has
been created . . . the employer is able to make a wide range of threats to his or her
employees...."); Kate E. Andrias, Note, A Robust Public Debate: Realizing Free Speech in
Workplace Representation Elections, 112 YALE L.J. 2415, 2433 (2003) (noting that in nonunion
workplaces "the employer structures and controls every aspect of the employment relationship").
98. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 101,
116 (1995) ("[N]ormally employers have the right to fire their employees at will, for good reason,
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on employers, along with their ability to speak to employees who may be
compelled to listen, means that employer communications may carry the
implicit threat of adverse consequences for employees taking actions
contrary to the expressed view of the company or organization. Several
studies have shown that employees believe there are consequences for not
complying with their employer's will.99
While it is often difficult to identify when particular statements or
actions have a coercive effect, because "coercion works by camouflaging
itself as choice,"100 scholars and courts have nevertheless increasingly come
to recognize how statements by employers or supervisors can coerce
employees. Social scientists have studied how power and coercion function
in the workplace, 10 1 and legal scholars and judicial opinions have examined
workplace coercion in contexts like sexual harassment and union organizing
campaigns. 102
Insights about the nature of the workplace and the potentially coercive
effects of employer communications in these other contexts can inform our
understanding of why structurally coercive relationships pose special
concerns. These other areas demonstrate the unique effect of
communications or actions by employers (or others who have authority in
the workplace) on employees. Indeed, it is impossible to understand these
areas without recognizing how structures of authority in the workplace
shape employer communications and employee responses to
communications.
In the context of sexual harassment, for example, the Supreme Court in
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton noted that "a harassing supervisor is always
assisted in his misconduct by the supervisory relationship" and that the
harassing actions of a supervisor "necessarily draw upon his superior
position over the people who report to him, or those under them."'' 0 3 The
opinion explains that employees may have difficulty walking away from
bad reason, or no reason at all."). Exceptions include common law whistleblower rules and
statutory protections like Title VII.
99. For a survey of studies in a variety of contexts, see id. at 119-23; and Andrias, supra note
97, at 2438.
100. Lea VanderVelde, Coercion in At-Will Termination of Employment and Sexual
Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 496, 498 (Catharine A. MacKinnon
& Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004).
101. For cites to and a brief summary of some of these studies, see Story, supra note 97, at
412-13. Story concludes that the studies "expose the myth of workplace relationships as voluntary
and consensual and, instead, reveal the workplace to be a focal point of power and coercion in
society." Id. at 413.
102. See infra notes 103-112 and accompanying text.
103. 524 U.S. 775, 802-03 (1998). Faragher addressed the liability of employers for the
sexual harassment of supervisors. See also Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998)
("[A] supervisor's power and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular
threatening character, and in this sense, a supervisor always is aided by the agency relation.").
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supervisor harassment when a supervisor has the power "to hire and fire,
and to set work schedules and pay rates.
10 4
Legal scholars have more generally analyzed how the coercive nature
of the workplace not only can contribute to sexual harassment but is
fundamental to our understanding of the dynamics of harassment. Jack
Balkin has stressed that the workplace environment is key to understanding
limits on sexually harassing speech:
Sexually harassing speech that would be protected outside of
the workplace becomes unprotected within it because it occurs in a
particular relationship of economic and social dependence ....
[S]peech used to create a hostile working environment is
unprotected not because of its content, but because in the social
context in which it occurs, it is used as a method of employment
discrimination.10 5
Lea VanderVelde has further explained that "sexual harassment law focuses
almost exclusively on the sexual aspect of the conduct,"',0 6 but that "it is not
gender alone that has rendered employees vulnerable to unwelcome sexual
approaches. It is also coercive circumstances of the at-will doctrine under
which employers and managers enjoy virtually unlimited prerogatives to
dismiss employees."'
10 7
Courts and labor law scholars have similarly recognized the coercive
effects of employer speech when employees campaign for unionization. In
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., the leading case on employer speech during
union campaigns, the Court held that the balancing of an employer's right
to speech and of employees' right to organize "must take into account the
economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and the
necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up
intended implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a
more disinterested ear." 10 8 But the decision, which permitted employer
predictions about the effects of unionization, has been criticized as opening
the door to a host of abusive communications, including predictions that
unionization will damage the company financially, cause layoffs, or force
relocation. 109 Labor law scholars have correctly pointed out that the
104. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803 (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLuM. L. REv. 2295, 2307
(1999).
106. VanderVelde, supra note 100, at 508.
107. Id. at 501; see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN 208 (1979) (asserting that sexual harassment is employment discrimination because it
"places the woman in the position of having to choose between tolerating or complying with
sexual demands on the one hand and suffering employment deprivation on the other").
108. 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969).
109. See Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and First-
Contract Campaigns: Implications for Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF
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distinction between predictions and threats is often a "fiction detached from
the employment relationship and modem economic reality.""
0
In addition to highlighting the authority structures in the at-will
workplace, several scholars have pointed out that employees are a captive
audience compelled to hear employer views on issues.'' As a result,
employees receive one-sided views on issus of concern to the employer
and are often unable to engage in self-help by choosing simply to avoid the
employer's communications. 
12
Finally, I should note that, although the employer-employee
relationship is the clearest and most developed example in the literature,
other relationships between defendants and potential class members may
also be structurally coercive. Identifying other relationships that constitute
structural coercion requires case-by-case analysis. The touchstone of such a
determination should be whether defendants have the power to impose
adverse (usually financial) consequences on potential class members.' 13 For
example, if minority members of a union alleged discriminatory union
practices, union leaders would hold a structurally coercive position over the
potential class members. Similarly, Kleiner involved a structurally coercive
relationship where the defendant was a bank and potential class members
were borrowers dependent on the bank for financing.
114
C. Defendant Communications in Structurally Coercive Relationships
The question of whether a structurally coercive relationship exists
would be irrelevant if defendants had no reason to communicate with
AMERICAN LABOR LAW 75, 82 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994) ("[E]mployers have virtually
unlimited opportunities to communicate aggressively with their employees during union
campaigns . . [T]hese employer communications can and often do include distortion,
misinformation, threats, and intimidation .. "); Andrias, supra note 97, at 2434-35 (noting the
various comments that employers are allowed to make during union campaigns).
110. Story, supra note 97, at 423.
111. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the
First Amendment, 1990 DUKE. L.J. 375, 423 ("Few audiences are more captive than the average
worker."); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First
Amendment Dog That Didn't Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 43; Story, supra note 97, at 417.
112. See, e.g., Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1,
13 (1990) ("[E]mployees sometimes may be forced to endure unwanted messages by virtue of
being unable to leave the workplace.").
113. Relationships may involve varying degrees of structural coercion. For example,
franchisors may have economic power over franchisees but lack opportunity to communicate on a
daily basis as employers do with their employees.
114. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. Case law offers some other examples. See,
e.g., Ralph Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 99 Civ. 4567(AGS), 2001 WL 1035132, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2001) (noting the "potential for abuse" where potential class members were
franchisees that depended on defendant franchisor for "[t]heir continued success and, indeed,
existence"); Hampton Hardware v. Cotter & Co., 156 F.R.D. 630 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (noting the
potential for coercion where the defendant was a member-owned wholesaler that controlled
supplies and the pricing of goods used by potential class members who were member hardware
stores).
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potential class members about pending suits. But just as named plaintiffs
and their counsel typically benefit from communicating with potential class
members, there is little doubt that defendants have much to gain in
communicating with potential class members to diminish support for suits
and reduce the size of classes. First, as courts have recognized, a smaller
class often means less liability for the defendant." 15 Second, reducing the
size of the class may limit the pool of individuals willing to contribute
relevant information to plaintiffs' counsel in the prosecution of the case.
Third, the decisions of potential class members to opt out may influence
public perceptions of the validity of the claims. Fourth, defendants may
simply want to limit the number of individuals participating, even
passively, in an adversarial contest against them-employers, for example,
may worry that participation in a case will lower employee morale, decrease
job performance, and create discord within the company. Finally, if
plaintiffs cannot satisfy the numerosity requirement of Rule 23, defendants
can defeat class certification altogether.
1 16
There is nothing inherently troubling about defendants wanting to
communicate their views about pending litigation even when potential class
members choose not to participate in the suit as a result. But courts have
recognized that both plaintiff and defendant communications can be abusive
and that the potential for abuse is greater when a structurally coercive
relationship exists. For one, courts have expressed concern about
communications that pressure or coerce potential class members to take
certain actions and, as a result, prevent them from independently assessing
the merits of the suit. If defendants in a position of structural authority
disparage the suit or encourage potential class members not to get involved,
potential class members may worry that there will be economic reprisals for
participating. 1 17
Furthermore, courts recognize that communications that misinform
potential class members about the lawsuit are inappropriate. Such
communications may confuse potential class members and prevent
informed decisions about participation.' 8 When a structurally coercive
115. See, e.g., Kleinerv. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1202 (11 thCir. 1985).
116. See Rice, supra note 13, at 155.
117. See, e.g., Belt v. EmCare, 299 F. Supp. 2d 664, 668 (E.D. Tex. 2003) (pointing to
defendant communications that "prey[ed] upon fears and concerns" about future employment);
Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., 186 F.R.D. 672, 679 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (noting that certain "internal
communication[s] could deter potential class members from participating in the suit out of
concern for the effect it could have on their jobs"); Hampton Hardware, 156 F.R.D. at 633 (noting
that potential class members were "less likely to feel that participation in the lawsuit [was] in their
best interest" when the defendant made comments suggesting that the prices of goods, which the
defendant controlled, would rise if the lawsuit proceeded).
118. See, e.g., Kleiner, 751 F.2d at 1203 ("The damage of misstatements could well be
irreparable."); Erhardt v. Prudential Group, 629 F.2d 843, 846 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Unapproved
notices to class members which are factually or legally incomplete, lack objectivity and neutrality,
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relationship exists, potential class members may rely on defendants for
information regarding their business relationship and may thereby be more
likely to accept as true subjective opinions or misleading statements.' 19
These two categories--coercion and misinformation-often work in
concert. Speech that aims to coerce or intimidate can use exaggerated or
incorrect information to accomplish its goal, and misleading speech can
sometimes function to coerce and intimidate the listener.
These concerns are amplified when potential class members are captive
audiences of defendants. When such communications go so far as to
prevent the class from going forward or being certified, they may also
interfere with general goals of class action litigation. Abusive defense
tactics may prevent the efficient adjudication of common claims in a single
suit 20 and inhibit the private-attorney-general function of class actions.
Defendant communications within structurally coercive relationships
present different concerns than those at issue in Bernard. The Bernard
Court struck down limitations aimed at preventing solicitation because they
were impeding the goals of class action litigation. But communications
within a structurally coercive relationship pose particular problems of
coercion and misinformation that did not exist in Bernard. As Part III
argues, these dangers justify certain prophylactic limitations.
III. PROPHYLACTIC ORDERS LIMITING DEFENDANT COMMUNICATIONS IN
STRUCTURALLY COERCIVE RELATIONSHIPS
A. Why Prophylactic Orders Are Desirable
It is hard to know how often defendant communications about class
actions occur or affect the decisionmaking of potential class members. But
both plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys recognize the significance of
defendant communications with potential class members,12' suggesting that
or contain untruths will surely result in confusion and adversely affect the administration of
justice."); Hampton Hardware, 156 F.R.D. at 634.
119. See, e.g., Hampton Hardware, 156 F.R.D. at 633 (noting that because potential class
members "necessarily rely upon the defendant for dissemination of factual information .... [t]hey
are therefore particularly susceptible to believing the defendant's comments that the lawsuit will
cost them money").
120. See Levenhagen, supra note 13, at 146.
121. For examples from the perspective of defendants' attorneys, see GEORGE A. STOHNER
ET AL., MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, TRENDS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW: AVOIDING CLASS
ACTIONS 31 (2001), available at http://www.morganlewis.com/pdfs/16B33497-936C-4ED8-
BAAC6729DCOD4091_Publication.pdf ("[T]he employer's public relations strategy should
address guidelines for control of the inevitable 'rumor-mill' as well as address issues related to
internal communications with both potential class members and non-members."); Charles S.
Mishkind et al., The EEO Class Action in the New Millennium, in LITIGATING EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CASES 1998, at 133, 219 (PLi Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook
Series No. H0-001C, 1998) ("Today, effective public and internal communication is essential in
class action litigation."); and Christina Feege et al., The Stealth Class Action, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 20,
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1978 [Vol. 114: 1953
20051
such communications are not only common but an important part of
defendants' response to class suits. And studies in the contexts of union
campaigns and sexual harassment have demonstrated that a high percentage
of employees believe that disagreement with employers' positions leads to
retaliation in some form. 22 Further, judicial opinions make clear that
numerous defendants in structurally coercive settings have engaged in
communications that seek to persuade potential class members that suits are
meritless and that appear to encourage them not to participate.1
23
Addressing inappropriate communications after they have occurred
does not sufficiently counter the potential dangers inherent in a structurally
coercive relationship. First, plaintiffs and the court may not detect the
abusive communications in time to properly respond and remedy the harm.
It is possible that many potentially inappropriate communications never
come to courts' attention because potential class members do not recognize
their impropriety or worry about reporting them to plaintiffs' counsel. Even
with prophylactic limitations, of course, unreported improper
communications may occur, but a court order of which potential class
members have notice is likely to both reduce improper communications and
increase reporting of such communications.
Second, limitations imposed by courts after abusive communications
often do not fully address the harms that have occurred. Although
prohibiting future communications, requiring notice about the case, or
mandating that communications be filed with the court may help prevent
further abuse, this does not remedy the abuse that may have already taken
place. 24 For example, if potential class members have already reacted to
2004, at 8 (recommending that employers "[m]anage communications with employees" and
"prepare 'talking points' for HR and managers"). For the plaintiffs' attorney perspective, see
Arnold Levin, An Overview from a Plaintiffs' Perspective of the Limits Set by the Law on
Discovery Directed to, and Communications with, Absent Class Members, in NATIONAL
INSTITUTE ON CLASS ACTIONS, at D- 17, D- 17 (1998) ("[T]he successful prosecution of class
actions may depend, in part, upon protecting the class from ... improper communications by
defendants ... ").
122. See supra note 99.
123. For example, in Hampton Hardware the defendants mailed potential class members a
letter saying that the lawsuit "will cost you precious dollars" and encouraging them to "[d]ecide
not to participate in the lawsuit." 156 F.R.D. at 631 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Belt the
defendants sent a letter to potential class members that "encourag[ed] class members not to join"
and that "suggest[ed] that ... [the] action could affect the potential class members' employment."
Belt v. EmCare, 299 F. Supp. 2d 664, 667-68 (E.D. Tex. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Shores v. Publix Super Mkts., No. 95-1162-CIV-T-25(E), 1996 WL 859985, at *3 (M.D.
Fla. Nov. 25, 1996) (finding that the defendant employer distributed written materials that "clearly
imply that it would be futile, and possibly detrimental to participate in the class"); Haffer v.
Temple Univ., 115 F.R.D. 506, 510 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (finding that the defendants distributed a
memo to potential class members that "was false and misleading in several respects").
124. See, e.g., Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1203 (11th Cir. 1985)
("[A] solicitations scheme relegates the essential supervision of the court to the status of an
afterthought." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Zarate v. Younglove, 86 F.R.D. 80, 90 n.13
(C.D. Cal. 1980) ("If there were an opt-out period, the difficulty in repairing damage from
misstatements during that limited time might well justify court control."); 1982 MANUAL FOR
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and made decisions based on coercive or misleading communications,
prohibiting future communications does little. And while corrective notices
may address this concern to some extent, courts have recognized that such a
remedy is highly imperfect and may even harm potential class members by
creating confusion about the case. 
125
Third, defendants that believe it is to their advantage to reduce the size
of the class may have an incentive to use abusive communications to
accomplish this goal. In order for any remedy to be administered, plaintiffs'
counsel must learn about and have access to evidence that abusive
communications have occurred and then convince a court that limitations
are justified. At worst, from a defendant's perspective, a court may impose
one of the remedies discussed above, but by then the defendant will already
have communicated its message to potential class members.
Although these same points can be made in regard to all party
communications, in structurally coercive relationships the potential for
harm is greatest. 126 Defendants in a position of structural power can engage
in regular, even daily, communications that may be difficult to monitor after
the fact. And the nature of structurally coercive relationships means that
even communications that are not overtly coercive can still have a powerful
coercive effect. Courts have engaged in detailed fact-finding and have
struggled to determine when statements are coercive or misleading. 127 The
current majority approach-considering limitations only when plaintiffs can
demonstrate that inappropriate communications have occurred-thus fails
to sufficiently protect class members when a structurally coercive
relationship exists.
The nature of structurally coercive relationships justifies some
prophylactic limitations on defendant communications as long as the
limitations are crafted to protect potential class members from abuse while
taking into account the interests of defendants. Cases like Burrell are wrong
to read Bernard as precluding such limitations without evidence that
defendants have already engaged in abusive communications. Although it is
plausible to read Bernard's language this way, the background of the case
and Rule 23 policies suggest that prophylactic restrictions may be justified
in limited circumstances. As explained above, Bernard was a response to
sweeping restrictions on communications that inhibited plaintiffs from
pursuing their claims. The Court called for "a clear record and specific
findings" to ensure that courts properly based limitations on some showing
COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 14, § 1.41, at 30 n.43 ("[I]mproper and unethical
communications were frequently difficult, and sometimes impossible, to detect in time to prevent
harm.
125. See, e.g., Hampton Hardware, 156 F.R.D. at 635.
126. See supra Section II.C.
127. For examples of opinions that have analyzed defendant communications and concluded
there was not enough evidence that they were inappropriate or misleading, see supra note 51.
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that abuse was of particular concern in the case at hand rather than on broad
allusions to the dangers of solicitation. But a prophylactic order that aims to
protect potential class members involved in a structurally coercive
relationship is a far cry from the pervasive and automatic bans on
communication that preceded Bernard and prompted that Court to call for
findings, a clear record, and a weighing of interests.
It is not inconsistent with the language of the opinion to impose
prophylactic restrictions when there is "a clear record and specific findings"
that a structurally coercive relationship exists. Nowhere in Bernard did the
Court mandate that specific instances of inappropriate communications be
demonstrated. It would be helpful for the Court to clarify Bernard, but until
then, courts should not read Bernard as precluding prophylactic limitations
to protect potential class members.
B. A Proposal for Prophylactic Restrictions
In order to protect potential class members and the class action device,
courts should impose prophylactic limitations on a defendant's
communications upon finding that the defendant is in a structurally coercive
relationship with potential class members. The employer-employee
relationship would automatically constitute such a relationship, as would
other relationships in which defendants have some control over the
economic well-being of potential class members. If a court determines that
such a relationship exists when the class claim is filed, it should issue the
following restrictions, which combine and build on those imposed in
Bublitz and A bdallah. 1
28
First, courts should prohibit defendants from communicating orally
about the case with potential class members unless potential class members
initiate the conversation. 129 As a number of courts have recognized, verbal
communications, especially in-person ones, are particularly dangerous. 130
128. One might argue that restrictions are only appropriate after class certification, because
only then is there certainty that the class action will proceed. But "[t]he effect of a defendant
attempting to influence potential plaintiffs not to join a potential class action is just as damaging to
the purposes of Rule 23 as a defendant that influences members of an already certified class to opt
out." Jenifer v. Del. Solid Waste Auth., Nos. CIV.A. 98-270 MMS & CIV.A. 98-565 MMS, 1999
WL 117762, at *2 (D. Del. Feb. 25, 1999).
129. There may be times where defendants and their counsel will need to communicate with
certain potential class members in order to gather evidence and prepare their defense. Courts
might consider "excluding such persons from the class if they have no genuine claims," MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 2, § 21.33, at 301, or permitting defendants to
speak to those specific individuals.
130. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978) ("[I]n-person
solicitation may exert pressure and often demands an immediate response, without providing an
opportunity for comparison or reflection. The aim and effect of in-person solicitation may be to
provide a one-sided presentation and to encourage speedy and perhaps uninformed
decisionmaking; there is no opportunity for intervention or counter-education ...." (footnote
omitted)); Bublitz v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 196 F.R.D. 545, 549 (S.D. Iowa 2000)
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This is of special concern in the context of coercive relationships where
defendants often have routine contact with potential class members and may
enjoy a captive audience. Second, any written communications should be
filed with the court and with plaintiffs' counsel. This will allow courts and
plaintiffs to respond to inappropriate communications when they occur and
will discourage defendants from making misleading or coercive
communications in the first place. Third, these written communications
should include notices explaining that defendants cannot retaliate against
potential class members for participating in the suit. Fourth, courts should
enunciate clear guidelines to all parties regarding permissible kinds of
communications.1 31 Defendants should be able to get prior approval from
the court if they are uncertain about whether a communication is
appropriate. Finally, as with other written communications, offers of
individual settlements should be filed with the court and opposing counsel
and should allow sufficient time for potential class members to reflect on
the offer and for plaintiffs' counsel to respond.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS AND OTHER OBJECTIONS
These proposed restrictions aim to limit communications in a fashion
that will sufficiently protect class members and advance the goals of class
action litigation. By exclusively addressing communications about the suit,
the proposal is sensitive to defendants' need to conduct their business. But
there are a number of possible arguments against the automatic imposition
of such limitations. This Part explains how the proposal satisfies the
requirements of the First Amendment and responds to other potential
criticisms.
A. The First Amendment and Employer Interests in Communicating with
Employees
As discussed above, protective orders prohibiting speech in class
actions must serve the policies and goals of Rule 23. But a court's analysis
cannot end there. As Bernard makes clear, any limitations must also satisfy
"standards . . . mandated by the First Amendment."' 32 Critics of my
proposal might assert that the current system is a sufficient and preferable
means of responding to abusive communications because courts impose
restrictions when there are abusive communications and can require
("[U]nsupervised oral solicitations produce distorted statements and the coercion of susceptible
individuals....").
13 1. In cases where there is no coercive relationship, courts should still warn parties at the
outset about making misleading statements to potential class members.
132. GulfOil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 104 (1981).
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defendants to issue corrective notices. They might further argue that
prophylactic orders of the type I suggest would represent an unnecessary
prior restraint that chills speech.
133
Courts plainly have the power to regulate and restrict speech to the
extent necessary to administer lawsuits. They routinely restrict speech
during litigation with no mention of the First Amendment, and the Supreme
Court has on numerous occasions affirmed courts' ability to regulate speech
in this context. 134 Inside the courtroom, courts regularly limit what counsel
and parties can say and when they can say it, and although "courtroom
speech is commonly regulated in ways that in other contexts would
constitute prior restraints, . . . . [s]uch regulation is not thought to raise
particular First Amendment problems." 135 Courts have more closely
scrutinized restraints on speech outside the courtroom, 136 upholding
restraints only if it can be shown that they are necessary to protect the
integrity of the judicial process. 137
133. Some made this type of argument about limitations on plaintiff communications prior to
Bernard. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1600
(1976) ("Class attorneys and class opponents may limit their communications with a class in order
to avoid the time consuming process of obtaining prior judicial clearance and limit the risk of
antagonizing the judge.").
134. In Bernard, for example, the Court noted that "[i]n the conduct of a case, a court often
finds it necessary to restrict the free expression of participants, including counsel, witnesses, and
jurors." Bernard, 452 U.S. at 104 n.21; see also Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33
n. 18 (1984) ("[Oin several occasions this Court has approved restriction on the communications
of trial participants where necessary to ensure a fair trial for a criminal defendant."); Christopher
J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA L. REV. 705, 705 (2004)
("[A]djudicative speech-speech intended to influence court decisions-is regularly and
systematically constrained by rules of evidence, canons of professional ethics, judicial gag orders,
and similar devices.").
135. Robert C. Post, The Management of Speech: Discretion and Rights, 1984 SUP. CT. REV.
169, 203; see also Peters, supra note 134, at 725 ("[C]ourts have never found restrictions on
adjudicative speech to be constitutionally controversial except when judges reach outside their
courtrooms .... "). Others have noted that, through rules of evidence and procedure, courts
regularly restrict what counsel and parties can say and when they can say it and utilize the
punishment of contempt to enforce these rules. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law
and the Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L. REV. 687, 690 (1997) ("[T]he trial that is both created and
regulated by prohibitions on speech is thereby among the most constrained of all communicative
environments.").
136. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (holding that a state rule
prohibiting lawyers from making certain extrajudicial statements to the press was void for
vagueness); Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459, 467 n.8 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Whatever may be
the limits of a court's powers in this respect, it seems clear that they diminish in strength as the
expressions and associations sought to be controlled move from the courtroom to the outside
world."), aff'd, 452 U.S. 89.
137. For example, the Court in Rhinehart upheld a protective order that prohibited one of the
parties from disseminating information gathered through discovery. It rejected arguments that this
violated the First Amendment, stating that "[t]he government clearly has a substantial interest in
preventing ... abuse of its processes." Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 35. Courts have also long upheld
rules prohibiting attorney communications with opposing represented parties. See, e.g., Gregory
G. Sarno, Annotation, Communication with Party Represented by Counsel as Ground for
Disciplining Attorney, 26 A.L.R.4TH 102, § 2, at 107 (1983) ("[I]n many decisions the courts have
expressly or apparently adopted or recognized the general view that a lawyer should or shall not
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Usually judicial restrictions on speech during adjudication limit what
parties can say in their capacity as litigants. 38 Employers in the contexts I
discuss, however, occupy the roles both of party to litigation and of
employer. It is often difficult to neatly categorize communications as falling
into either the employer speech or the litigant speech category, and there are
a number of legitimate reasons that defendant employers in class actions
may want to communicate with potential class members about the class
action. Defendants may simply seek to inform potential class members
about the suit,'3 9 respond to questions, or address plaintiff communications
that appear misleading or that threaten to cause serious financial damage to
the company.1 40 For example, in an employment discrimination claim,
defendants may want to tell employees about steps they are taking to
remedy problems raised by the lawsuit, such as firing those responsible for
the discriminatory conduct. Further, defendants may want to express a
sincere belief that participating in the lawsuit is not in the best economic
interests of the business or of potential class members. In all of these
scenarios, employers' communications with potential class members may
be an effort to ensure an efficient and productive workplace, without any
intent to intimidate employees into not participating in the suit. But these
and other types of communications about the suit may also improperly
pressure or coerce potential class members, depending on their exact
content and context.
The Supreme Court faced a similar conflict of roles in Gissel, which
involved the extent to which the NLRB could limit employer
communications about unionization under the National Labor Relations
Act. 141 The Court concluded that the free speech rights of employers
communicate on the subject matter of the representation of his or her client with one who is
known to be represented in the matter by another attorney." (citation omitted)).
138. One way to understand these limitations is through Robert Post's conception of
"managerial authority," in which "ordinary first amendment rights are subordinated to the
instrumental logic characteristic of organizations, and the state can in large measure control
speech on the basis of an organization's need to achieve its institutional ends." Robert C. Post,
Between Governance and Management. The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA
L. REV. 1713, 1775 (1987). But because employers may be speaking both as litigants and as
employers in class actions, Post would view limits on their communications with potential class
members as falling outside the boundaries of courts' managerial authority: "[F]or constitutional
purposes an organization's boundaries can be recognized by the predominance of functionally
defined organizational roles." Id. at 1793.
139. See Burrell v. Crown Cent. Petrol., 176 F.R.D. 239, 245 (E.D. Tex. 1997) ("Simply
because the company chooses to keep its employees informed of litigation affecting the company
does not attach an improper motive.").
140. See, e.g., Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurposes, 172 F.R.D. 462, 467 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
141. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). The Court was considering the
application of 29 U.S.C. § 158(c), which stated,
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence
of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964).
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"cannot outweigh the equal rights of the employees to associate freely" but
held that employers can express their "general views" on unionization,
including "prediction[s] as to the precise effects .. unionization will have
on [the] company."' 142 It determined that the NLRB's authority to limit
speech extended only to the prevention of employer threats, a restriction
that the Justices viewed as necessary to protect employees from
inappropriate coercive tactics. The Court appropriately sought to balance
the interest of the NLRB in ensuring fair union campaigns, as well as the
rights of employees to organize, with the free speech interests of
employers. 143
What the First Amendment requires, then, is that courts balance the
two roles of defendants-parties to a suit and employers-when
considering limitations on employer communications about class actions.
So what are the countervailing First Amendment interests of employers, and
how reluctant should courts be to limit their speech? There are two general
views of the extent to which the First Amendment protects workplace
speech. Some view such speech as generally outside public discourse and
deserving of limited constitutional protection.'" Others argue that the
workplace is an important site of social interaction in which citizens should
be able to communicate their views on political or cultural issues.
145
Engaging in this general debate is beyond the scope of this Note. But under
either view, it is appropriate to restrict employer communications with
potential class members about ongoing litigation.
Under the view that speech in the workplace is outside public discourse,
courts should recognize that the value embodied in employer speech is an
instrumental one aimed at production. 146 As a result, limitations on
142. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 617-18.
143. While the application of Gissel has sometimes allowed abusive communications, see
supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text, I believe the Supreme Court was correct to analyze
the problem as one of competing interests.
144. See, e.g., Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249,
1273 (1995) (explaining that the workplace is "ordinarily regarded as a site of production");
Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist Speech, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171, 207 (1990) ("[T]he government may treat speech involving economic
transactions, for example, in both the public and private sector employment context, as outside the
general marketplace of discourse .... ").
145. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND
LIBERTIES OF SPEECH 83 (1995) ("For many people, the workplace is a main locus of discussion
about public affairs and matters of personal significance .... The scope of free speech is not
limited to discourse in some public space."); Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and
Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1797-98 (1992).
146. Some scholars and courts have asserted that we should define defendant speech with
potential class members as commercial and thereby accord it less protection than noncommercial
speech. See, e.g., Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1203-04 (1 1th Cir. 1985);
Hampton Hardware v. Cotter & Co., 156 F.R.D. 630, 633 (N.D. Tex. 1994); Levenhagen, supra
note 13, at 150. Although this might be an attractive and practical means of triggering a lower
level of judicial scrutiny and achieving the correct result, it does not seem to fit with typical
commercial speech cases addressing issues like advertising and solicitation, nor does it comport
with analyses of employer speech in cases like Gissel.
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communications are not constitutionally problematic if they protect
potential class members and do not interfere with employers' ability to run
their businesses. A more robust view of speech in the workplace, by
contrast, might argue for greater First Amendment protection than what
business operations require. But even proponents of such a position do not
deny the need to sometimes restrict speech in the workplace to serve state
interests. 147 The j udiciary has a strong interest in ensuring the
administration of justice and protecting the integrity of its processes. As I
have argued, prophylactic limitations will protect potential class members
and the efficacy of the class action device. Further, the limitations I propose
are fashioned to interfere as little as possible with the employer's ability to
run the workplace.
It is true that defendants might censor their speech more than is
necessary. But any such censoring of comments about a pending class
action would likely be minimal and would not interfere with employers'
ability to run their businesses. Written communications would still be
allowed, and the limitation on oral communications would extend only to
the case and not to other matters. Defendants might also self-censor
ambiguous oral statements that could be construed either as part of business
operations or as about pending class action.148 Or they might refrain from
expressing political views that could implicate the suit. 149 Courts should
therefore make clear that unless the communications directly address the
case, they are presumptively appropriate. This presumption should be
overcome when there is evidence suggesting that the communications are
interfering with the administration of justice or that the defendant's true
purpose is to discourage support for the suit.
B. Other Objections to Prophylactic Limitations
There are a number of other possible objections to the limitations I
propose. One might be that defendants must have the ability to defend
themselves to their employees and the public when faced with a claim that
the company believes to be false.150 This is of special concern if named
147. For example, Eugene Volokh concedes that there is a "state interest in ensuring equality
of working conditions," Volokh, supra note 145, at 1867, and that "[m]uch of harassment law" is
constitutional, id. at 1796.
148. In response to discrimination problems highlighted by a filed claim, for instance,
employers might reasonably want to communicate about new polices that have been implemented
without making reference to the pending suit.
149. Communications about an employer's views on class action tort reform, for example,
might fall into this category.
150. See Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., No. 02 C 6832, 2003 WL 22232907, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 16, 2003) (discussing the relevance of an employer e-mail sent to employees "in
response to publicity surrounding the filing of the complaint"); Mishkind et al., supra note 12 1, at
210-11 ("[C]Iass actions raise heightened concerns where the employer is large and well known
because, inevitably, there will be a battle for the hearts and minds of both the public and the
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plaintiffs and their counsel engage in widespread communications alleging
violations, thereby coercing the defendant into settling despite its belief that
the plaintiffs' claims are tenuous or false. This is a legitimate concern, and
courts managing class actions should not allow plaintiffs and their counsel
to improperly attack defendants. But because defendants can communicate
in writing, a court should only relax the restrictions in exceptional
situations, when it is clear that fairness demands that defendants be able to
respond immediately to plaintiff statements.
Another critique might assert that prohibiting defendants from
communicating freely with potential class members prevents defendants
and willing potential class members from reaching individual settlements.151
But as one court aptly stated, "Settlement cannot come... at the expense of
the class action mechanism itself to the detriment of putative class
members."' 52 And under my proposal, defendants can still communicate in
writing as well as with potential class members who initiate contact.
Further, the court can grant the defendant leave from the order to discuss
settlements if the situation warrants it.
Finally, one might assert that the proposal will burden courts with the
time-consuming task of reviewing defendant communications filed with the
court and responding to plaintiffs' complaints. But motions and cross-
motions seeking limitations can already consume significant amounts of
courts' and parties' time.153 It is doubtful that my proposal will increase the
burden on courts, and if courts set out clear guidelines after class actions are
filed, it is possible that it will actually reduce the time devoted to
communications issues.
CONCLUSION
The recent and widely publicized gender discrimination claims against
Wal-Mart and Morgan Stanley illustrate that class actions often involve
defendants who hold a structurally coercive position over potential class
members. Such relationships present special problems for judges, who are
defendants' employees which will, in turn, affect the employer's relations with its workers as well
as pose a real and immediate threat to its business goodwill and integrity with the public.").
151. Cf Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 n.14 (1981) ("In Title VII, Congress
expressed a preference for voluntary settlements of disputes through the conciliation process.");
In re The Exxon Valdez, 229 F.3d 790, 795 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he general policy of federal
courts to promote settlement before trial is even stronger in the context of large-scale class
actions.").
152. Keystone Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 238 F. Supp. 2d 151, 154 (D.D.C. 2002).
153. The time-consuming nature of communications issues is demonstrated in Babbitt v.
Albertson's, No. C-92-1883 SBA (PJH), 1993 WL 150300 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1993). There the
court refused to issue a corrective notice after determining that the passage of time meant that
such notice was "more likely to add to the confusion of potential class members than to dispel it."
Id. at *8; see also Miller, supra note 13, at 731 ("[D]ebate over communications can be very time
consuming.").
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responsible for protecting potential class members from abuse. As with
other aspects of class action lawsuits, the issue of communications
engenders contentious debate. While plaintiffs' counsel seek orders that
they claim are necessary to protect class members and the administration of
justice,"' others postulate that the "concerns about potential coercion are as
a general rule exaggerated, overblown and overstated."'' 55 Without clear
guidance from the leading Supreme Court opinion on the matter, conflicts
have emerged among lower courts over how to protect potential class
members in structurally coercive relationships with defendants. Carefully
crafted protective orders that do not interfere with defendants' interests in
conducting their business are consistent with the First Amendment, the
goals of class action litigation, and the courts' responsibility to protect
potential class members.
154. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 121, at D-17.
155. Douglas R. Richmond, Class Actions and Ex Parte Communications: Can We Talk?,
68 Mo. L. REV. 813, 857 (2003). The attorney-author goes on to assert that
[p]laintiffs' counsel typically want to limit or prohibit defendants' communications
with putative class members not because they truly fear coercion, but because they fear
truthful communications and reasonable individual settlements that will have the effect
of reducing the expected fee awards. For this reason alone courts should be reluctant to
restrain defendants' communications with putative class members. In the event
challenged communications actually are coercive, a court can always send a curative
notice at the defendant's expense.
Id. at 857-58 (footnote omitted).
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